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Crises can be moments of opportunity—but for 
whom? As I write, the stock market flourishes 
and the Federal Reserve takes unprecedented 
action to protect corporate America from the 
fiscal meltdown caused by Covid-19.1 Yet a 
social-economic disaster has engulfed the 
American working class: lost jobs and health 
insurance, and “essential workers” callously 
exposed to the pandemic. Next in line are state 
and local public sector workers. Absent sub-
stantial relief from Washington, government 
employers will cry poverty, try to rip up union 
contracts, and cut the provision of services.2 
Will government workers, their unions, and the 
affected public find ways to push back? Is there 
the political will to tap heretofore untaxed 
sources of revenue? Will public employee 
unions focus only on defending their piece of 
reduced budgets or attempt to flex atrophied 
muscles, fighting alongside the communities 
they serve to chart a more expansive and pro-
gressive vision of America?
Absent substantial relief from 
Washington, government employers 
will cry poverty, try to rip up union 
contracts, and cut the provision of 
services. Will government workers, 
their unions, and the affected 
public find ways to push back? 
Scholars are naturally drawing parallels 
between our current crisis and the Great 
Depression.3 In the early 1930s, the AFL was 
hesitant to seize the main chance, but despite the 
perils of organizing at a time of mass unemploy-
ment, working-class struggles ultimately 
emerged, sparking decades of protest and mass 
movements that brought a liberatory rise in liv-
ing standards, the Great Compression, and the 
end of Jim Crow. Often, labor mobilized whole 
working-class communities to help them orga-
nize and raise wages.4 And more often than they 
are given credit for, unions led fights against 
racial segregation and economic injustice in the 
working-class neighborhoods where their mem-
bers lived. It was not just in historian Herbert 
Gutman’s studies of the nineteenth century that 
labor and communities worked together.5 Thus 
was built an imperfect yet, by subsequent stan-
dards, golden age of increasing equality.
The Harbinger of Neoliberal 
Austerity
But another crisis, starting with budget short-
falls and imminent default in New York City 
(NYC) (1974-1975), would usher in almost half 
a century of neoliberal austerity and growing 
inequality. As David Harvey, professor of 
anthropology and geography, notes, “the man-
agement of the NYC fiscal crisis pioneered the 
way for neoliberal practices both domestically 
under Reagan and internationally through the 
IMF [International Monetary Fund] in the 
1980s.”6 Recently, historian Kim Phillips-Fein 
has convincingly argued for the central role of 
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Washington in imposing austerity as its price 
for federal assistance. Treasury Secretary 
William Simon and Council of Economic 
Advisors Chair Alan Greenspan saw their 
opportunity to dismantle NYC’s flawed but 
vibrant form of social democracy as the open-
ing salvo in an effort to unwind the New Deal/
Great Society state. New York’s symbolic sig-
nificance as a town where the working class 
and unions still wielded some power was icing 
on the cake. Mainstream Democrats, led by 
Senator William Proxmire, required stiffer con-
cessions from New York’s municipal unions 
before even the limited aid of bond guarantees 
was proffered. Prodded by Washington, the 
New York State government established an 
“Emergency Financial Control Board” (EFCB), 
headed by financiers and corporate executives, 
to ride herd on the city budget and union con-
tracts. By mid-1976, significant structural, 
political, and cultural elements of working-
class austerity had been established.7
. . . responses of New York’s 
seemingly powerful municipal trade 
unions foreshadowed and perhaps 
even set in motion the subsequent 
fall of the house of labor nationally. 
The halting, indecisive, and ultimately con-
cessionary responses of New York’s seemingly 
powerful municipal trade unions foreshadowed 
and perhaps even set in motion the subsequent 
fall of the house of labor nationally. They 
accepted economic austerity and the ideological 
premise that the working class should pay for 
the crisis in exchange for a sort of junior-partner 
corporatism or tripartitism. Successfully imple-
mented in one labor stronghold, it spread in 
almost exact form to another—the auto sector—
in 1979 via the wage concessions demanded by 
President Carter as the price for Chrysler loan 
guarantees. There, the private sector equivalent 
of NYC’s wages tied to productivity and junior-
partner tripartitism were “profit sharing, instead 
of indexed wages, and board representation.”8 
Then came steel—wage cuts for tariff protec-
tions. A pattern was set: alongside abrupt blood-
letting spurred by industries only too eager to 
smash unions and cut wages were decades of 
managed decline in the wages and working con-
ditions of the American working class. We hear 
the same mantra today from the head of the 
Service Employees International Union, who 
argues that Republican anti-labor recalcitrance 
can be overcome, “when we get employers, 
workers and government coming together to 
solve problems.”9
But was—and is—a different path possible? 
In the proving ground of NYC, the municipal 
labor unions and close observers first thought 
their wage concessions and the paring of gov-
ernment-provisioned services were a painful 
but only temporary setback.10 Later analyses 
saw the long-term effects more clearly, even 
mourned them, but largely accept contempora-
neous assessments that these were the least bad 
alternatives.11 Sometimes, solutions were 
framed on a national scale—not wholly wrong, 
but relieving local actors from agency and 
responsibility.12 I argue, instead, that the pres-
ent Covid-19-induced economic crisis allows 
us to see those times more clearly. Although the 
causes of the two crises were different, the 
demand of capital and the state requiring the 
working class to tighten their belts is strikingly 
similar. Alternatives to austerity existed then, as 
they do today; some of those alternatives were 
and are local.13 Looking at what labor did 
wrong then, might help it and working-class 
movements now, as we hope for better out-
comes than deepened austerity.
The Onset of the Crisis
Unlike our pre-Covid neoliberal social welfare 
parsimony, during the decade prior to the fiscal 
crisis of the 1970s, government expenditures 
had risen due to higher wages and better bene-
fits for public workers and increased services 
and payments to the poor; this was the apogee of 
the welfare state. Union gains began to slow in 
the early 1970s, due to federal wage and price 
guidelines and state legislation which rolled 
back pension improvements. At the same time, 
deindustrialization and white flight to the sub-
urbs shrank NYC’s tax base, and federal dis-
bursements to cities were slashed by the Nixon 
administration. Then the 1969-1970 and 1973 
recessions increased welfare costs and further 
reduced tax revenues. For ten years, NYC 
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addressed budget imbalances with healthy doses 
of wishful thinking and, encouraged by its bank-
ing bond underwriters, increasing amounts of 
short-term debt.14 In 1974, banks began to sell 
their city bonds, bloating an already shrinking 
market, causing rates for new debt to rise, and 
further exacerbating financial pressures. In early 
1975, banks refused to underwrite new NYC 
debt. This created a cash flow crisis: bills had to 
be paid, payroll met—and, of course, bonds 
were supposed to be redeemed when due.15
This raised the possibility of default, where 
the city government and various creditor groups 
would spar in the courts on which disburse-
ments to prioritize. Here was an unknown, then 
and now: Would a court give most favorable 
treatment to bondholders, or would it fear the 
political dangers of imposing austerity in the 
nation’s largest city? In a January 1975 memo to 
his boss, the head of the municipal bond depart-
ment at Chemical Bank raised the possibility 
that banks would receive funds only after the 
city payroll had been met. In August, the city’s 
Corporation Counsel declared that “city ser-
vices would certainly take precedence over 
noteholders’ demands.” In September, the First 
Deputy Mayor listed priorities in case of default: 
“payroll, welfare, Medicaid, the Health and 
Hospitals Corporation, day care, and transit. 
Notably,” remarked Phillips-Fein, “the payment 
of interest on the city’s debts was absent from 
the list.”16 On October 17, 1975, when default 
seemed imminent, the City Controller stopped 
distribution of paychecks to sanitation workers, 
yet simultaneously a State Supreme Court jus-
tice “signed a writ at the request of the city to 
ratify priorities—with vital services heading the 
list, and meeting city payrolls taking precedence 
over payment to holders of city debts.”17 So, the 
banks had plenty to be nervous about.
. . . Albert Shanker, head of the 
United Federation of Teachers, 
blinked first: he anteed up $150 
million of pension fund money to 
pay off bonds due that day, and 
default was averted.
But so did union leaders. A court might con-
ceivably undo labor contracts, order layoffs, or 
reduce retiree pensions. Later that day, Albert 
Shanker, head of the United Federation of 
Teachers (UFT), blinked first: he anteed up 
$150 million of pension fund money to pay off 
bonds due that day, and default was averted.18 
Shanker’s decision marked the final chapter in 
a year-long turn of the municipal unions from 
bravado to concessions. In this high-stakes 
game of “chicken,” the Simon-Greenspan strat-
egy had worked.
Labor, With and Without  
the Community
Are unions inevitably defensive organizations 
rather than weapons of the working class, as 
economist and labor historian Selig Perlman 
argued almost a century ago?19 Must they lose 
vigor and become institutionalized? That was 
the intent of NYC Mayor Robert Wagner (1954-
1965), who had spent years offering union rec-
ognition and bargaining rights in return for 
pliability and deference. The city’s Office of 
Collective Bargaining (1965) and the state’s 
Taylor Law (1967) were meant to regularize 
employer–union relationships, mediate dis-
putes, prevent strikes, and limit the scope of 
bargaining to the “terms and conditions of 
employment.”20 Yet Perlman’s argument would 
have seemed dubious (and government’s efforts 
fruitless) in 1967 New York. The city was in the 
midst of years of “can you top this?” efforts by 
its municipal unions, resulting in a spate of 
strikes despite the legal prohibitions. Lacking 
union- or agency-shop provisions, unions had 
to be aggressive enough to convince workers to 
sign up and become members. Moreover, some 
strikes had what we now call “bargaining for 
the common good” goals—demands benefiting 
the public the union served. Against fierce city 
resistance, a two-month strike of social workers 
in 1965 pushed to expand scope of bargaining, 
to a limited extent winning better treatment of 
their welfare clients and smaller caseloads. 
Teachers did the same when they fought for 
smaller class sizes and increased funding for 
schools in poverty-stricken neighborhoods.21 
Some contractual demands can be simultane-
ously self-interested and altruistic.
But alliances with the public around a com-
mon social-democratic vision could also be 
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ruptured by conflicting agendas, electoral 
needs, or simply union leadership disinclina-
tion toward consultation and deference. The 
UFT, which had fought so hard to expand 
teacher autonomy, resisted ceding some of it 
back to communities and parents who sought 
more control over curriculum, hiring, and even 
discipline of students.22 Its infamous two-
month Ocean Hill-Brownsville strike in the fall 
of 1968 pitted the union’s line-in-the-sand 
defense of job security and its seniority system 
against the neighborhood school board’s desire 
to implement a more Afro-centric curriculum 
and rid itself of a handful of teachers seen as 
openly defying that effort.23 In 1971, municipal 
workers, upset that negotiated pension improve-
ments were stalled in the state legislature, 
locked drawbridges in the open position and 
released untreated sewage into surrounding 
waterways.24 Here were cases where the “spe-
cial interests” of public workers and city resi-
dents seemed directly counter-posed. In 1975, 
when it seemed inevitable that the expenditure 
pie would shrink, squabbling over the crumbs 
intensified. While municipal workers, small 
businesses, the poor, and the working class 
fought “defensive battle[s],” economist William 
Tabb observed, “banks, developers, and corpo-
rations expect incentives. . . . these ‘bribes’ by 
the state . . . force a reduction in public sector 
services.” It was not inevitable that in 1980, 20 
percent of revenue went to debt service, while 
only 13 percent was allocated for all human 
resources and social service expenditures.25 
Rather, it reflected which class was unafraid to 
grasp for and seize power.
From Resistance to 
Concessions
In the first months of the fiscal crisis, prodded 
by angry and fearful members, and with even 
some Local presidents calling for a general 
strike against layoffs, city unions rejected the 
narrative that there was no money and workers 
must sacrifice.26 The public apex of union 
efforts came during the summer of 1975. A June 
demonstration outside the corporate headquar-
ters of David Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan 
Bank, meant “to dramatize their assertion that 
the banks are bleeding the city by imposing high 
interest rates on city borrowing,” was called “a 
very, very scary kind of experience” by finan-
cier Felix Rohatyn. Thirty thousand rallied 
against budget cuts at a protest jointly called by 
the UFT and a Board of Education not under 
mayoral control. Laid-off police closed down 
the Brooklyn Bridge. After a two-day sanitation 
worker wildcat strike, the city rescinded the lay-
offs of a quarter of that workforce. Mayor Abe 
Beame, caught between insistent banks and 
union mobilizations, waffled, announcing lay-
offs and then postponing them.27
In 1975, when it seemed inevitable 
that the expenditure pie would 
shrink, squabbling over the crumbs 
intensified. 
On the first day of school, UFT leftists led 
angry teachers facing ten thousand layoffs, 
mass reassignments, and class sizes of forty and 
even fifty in an overwhelming rejection of a 
tentative contract that sanctioned these horrific 
learning conditions and added a wage freeze.28 
“The mood,” the New York Times reported, 
“was that of enthusiasm for a fight that, the 
teachers said, was not for their benefit alone, 
but for the benefit of their pupils. Their rallying 
cry was lower class sizes.”29 Voting to strike the 
next day, at least the glimmer of a renewed alli-
ance with parents and communities beckoned.
Meanwhile, though, the unions laid the 
groundwork for concessions. According to histo-
rian Joshua Freeman, the Chase Manhattan dem-
onstration “seemed to frighten [Victor] 
Gotbaum,” the head of AFSCME DC37, New 
York’s largest union.30 Behind closed doors, 
Gotbaum, Teamsters Local 237 President Barry 
Feinstein, and trusted consultant Jack Bigel nego-
tiated the so-called Americana agreement (named 
for the hotel where the deal was struck); meekly, 
most other unions signed on. The agreement 
rolled back an earlier wage hike and pledged 
work rule concessions to fund health benefits.31 A 
handful of labor autocrats decided on austerity: 
there were no membership votes on these con-
tractual changes, and even discussion in the offi-
cer and delegate bodies was squelched.32 Yet the 
unions received no guarantees against further 
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service cuts or layoffs, which reached 20 percent 
of the workforce within a year.33
A handful of labor autocrats 
decided on austerity: there were 
no membership votes on these 
contractual changes, and even 
discussion in the officer and 
delegate bodies was squelched. 
Now, the unions’ problem became one of 
managing their members’ dashed expectations. 
The police and firefighters’ unions—which had 
rejected the Americana agreement but found 
themselves effectively bound by its terms—were 
the least successful, and for a period of time, 
their leaders were ousted at each election. Just 
three weeks after their successful wildcat strike, 
the city renewed layoffs of sanitation workers, 
and despite sporadic picketing of garages, the 
union convinced its members to challenge that 
action (ultimately, unsuccessfully) in the courts 
rather than the streets.34 After a week on strike, 
demoralized teachers narrowly accepted the 
same pact they had rejected and returned to 
work. Their lost pay and the fines levied for 
striking under the Taylor Law subsidized the 
return of a quarter of the laid-off staff—“the 
strike has been a tax on teachers,” the Board of 
Education gloated—while additional cuts in 
payroll costs were effectively achieved by elimi-
nating ninety minutes of schooling a week. Here 
was an agreement crafted to save the city money 
at the expense of students.35
Shanker chastised his members: “A strike is a 
weapon you use against a boss that has money. 
This boss has no money.”36 In fact, the city did 
have money, but it was seemingly committed to 
using it to prevent default. A month later, when 
Shanker (following his peers) agreed to load up 
his pension fund with city bonds, the circle was 
closed. Heretofore, the unions had worried that 
payments to creditors would supersede those to 
workers and retirees; now, their retirees were the 
creditors, seemingly bound by self-interest to 
support austerity politics. In just a few months, 
“a fatalism toward the inevitability of cuts had 
apparently been projected on taxpayers, munici-
pal workers, and service recipients.”37
Shanker chastised his members: “A 
strike is a weapon you use against 
a boss that has money. This boss has 
no money.” In fact, the city did have 
money . . . 
Once unions accepted the premise of steep 
service reductions, imposition of tuition at the 
City University, and transit fare hikes, they for-
feited their ability to rally the people of New 
York against austerity. Recounting two 
instances where cuts were partially averted, 
Phillips-Fein finds no magic bullet.38 In the 
context of a fragmented opposition, Darwinian 
competition prevailed. A handful of the best 
organized staved off the worst consequences of 
a larger, grimmer story.
Political Insiders, but at What 
Cost?
What of the unions themselves? Concessions 
and pension fund money allowed them to main-
tain their institutional presence, if not substan-
tial influence—a slim silver lining to the cloud 
of austerity and forty years of increasing 
inequality. Priding themselves as “political 
insiders,” scholars Marco Hauptmeier and 
Lowell Turner observe, New York’s unions 
made little attempt to build the social agenda 
coalitions that might have brought them real 
power.39 Collective bargaining was “saved”—if 
it was ever really at risk—but the decades since 
have exchanged calamitous decline for the slow 
drip of defeat. Labor scholar Ian MacDonald 
asks how it can be that New York is both the 
center of neoliberalism and a “union town,” and 
answers that the victors of the fiscal crisis 
worked through existing institutions of class 
relations rather than destroy them.40
Three 1977 events show this institutionaliza-
tion of collaboration, and the rejection of a class 
perspective, more explicitly. Beginning that 
January, union leaders and bankers met monthly 
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over “coffee, doughnuts [for] some very private 
discussion of economic, fiscal and management 
issues facing city government . . . . ‘I’m 
amused’,” smirked Mayor Ed Koch, “they really 
like each other and talk about how they attend 
each other’s children’s weddings.”41 In the 
spring, unions rejected an offer from Governor 
Hugh Carey to amend public sector labor law to 
make it more like the private sector. Unions 
would, effectively, have gained the right to 
strike, and employers the unilateral right to 
change contract terms at expiration. They opted 
instead for defensive stability, and to this day, 
the Taylor Law’s anti-strike provision is invoked 
as a threat against restive public sector work-
ers.42 And that summer, the state legislature, 
responding to growing union concerns that 
angry workers were canceling their union mem-
berships, legalized the agency shop, effectively 
allowed collection of dues from all represented 
workers, members or not. New York’s civil ser-
vice newspaper bluntly explained why:
An agency shop will help unions be more 
objective in dealing with employers and 
better able to pursue a more responsible 
course of action. . . . Unions, even with 
their own financial solvency at stake 
agreed to no-raise contracts, wage 
increase deferrals and fringe benefit give-
backs so the city could avoid bankruptcy 
. . . . [The Mayor’s] support of the agency 
shop bill was, in part, predicated on pro-
tecting the solvency of unions so they, in 
turn, would be strong enough to resist 
membership pressure. . . . The agency 
shop will bring greater stability to labor-
management relations and will result in 
more statesmanship on the part of union 
leaders who are free from the fear of eco-
nomic blackmail by their members.43
Here was the tally sheet: non-responsive to 
their members, turning their backs on the com-
munities they served, hobnobbing with bank-
ers, abandoning the strike weapon. At best, we 
can say that for more than forty years, New 
York labor has fought rearguard actions to 
defend an unsatisfactory status quo.44 Social 
democracy receded in the rearview mirror.
Can Labor Turn This Crisis 
into an Opportunity?
Crises are moments of opportunity, but it is not 
foreordained who will seize the ring. In the first 
years of neoliberalism, New York’s municipal 
labor unions, the labor movement as a whole, and 
other mass movements of liberation were all far 
stronger and more experienced than they are 
today, yet shortsightedness and fear meant they 
failed to rise to the challenge of those times. They 
fragmented into competing interest groups 
defending their slice of a shrinking pie, becoming 
far less than the sum of their parts. The demands 
of austerity might have led to worker–commu-
nity alliances, but labor was too timid, too afraid 
of defeat, too committed to backroom deals, to 
vigorously defend the New Deal state and the 
Great Compression. We cannot say for sure what 
would have happened if labor had acted with the 
same boldness as capital and its Washington 
allies, but we know the dismal result of the 
choices it made: periods of stagnation inter-
spersed with backward lurches. Charitably, we 
might forgive their decisions as a misjudging of 
entirely new circumstances, but who will excuse 
labor today if it treads the same errant path?
The past decade has also shown us tantaliz-
ing glimmers of a different trajectory. Occupy 
popularized the narrative of the 1 percent—a 
new ideological framework. The State 
Priorities Partnership, a center-left counterpart 
to the better-known American Legislative 
Exchange Council (ALEC), promotes, albeit 
cautiously, “a just and equitable America.”45 
Think tanks such as the Rutgers-based Center 
for Innovation in Worker Organization pro-
mote bargaining-for-the-common-good ideas 
as a pragmatic strategy to win by building alli-
ances and therefore power.46 Education unions, 
such as the Chicago Teachers Union and the 
UMass Faculty Staff Union, are trying to apply 
those principles and build alliances with the 
communities they serve, while teachers in West 
Virginia blazed a path to mass support in a 
deeply red state.47 The powerful nationwide 
Black Lives Matter protests remind us that vic-
tories are achievable and aspirations can dra-
matically expand in the course of just a few 
weeks. Finally, where Gotbaum and Shanker 
struggled to locate alternate sources of 
Kagan 7
revenue, now those are clear: “tax the rich” 
plans are abundant, and the ability of 
Washington to simply write checks is 
manifest.48
Still, honesty compels us to note that, like the 
AFL in 1933, there has been more talk than action 
by labor. As millions have marched, labor as an 
organized presence has been largely absent from 
the Black Lives Matter movement, once again 
missing an opportunity to build solidarity with 
natural allies. And opposition to forthcoming lay-
offs and service cuts has been largely limited to 
insider politics in statehouses and city halls.
Indeed, arguments for extreme caution and 
prudence are articulated anew, if with different 
rationales: the race to the bottom is an accom-
plished ideological dogma; unions are too weak 
to take risks; workers’ aspirations are more 
muted, and most lack experience in even tame 
forms of class struggle; and the economic crisis 
is only temporary.
There are alternatives to austerity 
today as there were then, both 
as to raising revenues and how to 
spend them. 
Labor needs to rethink its shopworn modus 
operandi, starting with a willingness to imagine 
a wholly different future and a commitment to a 
strategy of bargaining for the common good. 
Because labor is weak, it is even more impera-
tive that it forges unity with the public it has 
spurned for too long. There are alternatives to 
austerity today as there were then, both as to 
raising revenues and how to spend them. 
Success is hardly guaranteed, but now we 
know—as our predecessors did not—what the 
costs are of shying from that fight.
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